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DOES INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW HAVE SOMETHING TO TEACH
MONETARY LAW?
Cynthia C Lichtenstein *
Although the subject of exchange controls, a substantial part of
international monetary law,I seems hardly at first glance to be as grip-
ping a matter of international concern as international human rights,
the first glance neglects the place of exchange controls in the life blood
of developing nations. If, instead of referring to exchange controls,
one speaks of the human costs of the international debt crisis, the
point is quickly made. Students in a class in international monetary
law do see a connection between the outflow of hard currency to repay
external debt and the political consequences for a nation that, in order
to meet its contractual obligations, must reexport higher and higher
proportions of its hard currency earnings. Students then quickly grasp
the importance to a developing country of its hard currency export
earnings, and come to understand why the multilateral treaty regulat-
ing currency exchanges (the Bretton Woods Agreement, sometimes
called the "Fund Agreement" because the treaty also provides for es-
tablishment of the International Monetary Fund), despite its general
hostility to exchange controls, has special provisions authorizing
member countries not yet able, because of their stage of development,
to move to full convertibility, to keep their panoply of protection for
their reserves. Indeed, in a crisis such countries may, with Fund ap-
proval, institute a new regime of exchange controls. The Fund Agree-
ment, by its provisions for Fund oversight of exchange controls,
insures that these drags on world commerce are only used when neces-
sary (in the Fund's appreciation) to stem serious outflows of hard cur-
rency or to ensure that the nation's hard currency earnings are turned
over to the central government for allocation in accordance with a
plan of protection. Students come to see the importance of this tool to
a country's macroeconomic management.
Classically, however, exchange controls were not divided into "ap-
proved" exchange controls versus currency restrictions otherwise out-
* Professor, Boston College Law School. President, American Branch, International Law
Association.
1. See, e.g. F.A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY Ch. XV (4th ed. 1982).
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lawed by the Fund Agreement. Instead, the management of its own
currency was an inherent right of each sovereign state, in its own sov-
ereign appreciation. The one limitation on the autonomy of the state
was a conflict of law rule that operated to prevent extraterritorial ef-
fect from being given to exchange controls: the rule that "exchange
controls, like tax and penal laws, are enforceable only in the territory
of the sovereign that issued them."'2 Thus, as Professor Lowenfeld
points out, even if the normal conflicts rules of the forum would look
to the laws of another jurisdiction for decision concerning a transac-
tion, the forum would not give effect to that jurisdiction's exchange
controls - or even recognize them as a defense.
3
Since the Fund Agreement, in contrast, made exchange controls a
matter of international concern, and limited the autonomy of the par-
ties with respect to currency restrictions, 4 it also set out, in Article
VIII § 2(b), to change the conflicts rule limiting enforcement, at least
as to use of exchange control violations as a defense. Space prevents a
complete description of Article VIII § 2(b), 5 but the idea behind it is
that a member state's courts must accept violation of "approved" ex-
change restrictions as a defense to enforcement of "exchange contracts
which involve the currency" of a country that has imposed such IMF-
approved restrictions on its currency. Each state member of the
Agreement has promised in Article VIII § 2(b) that, if the conditions
of the section are met, its courts will not be used to enforce the offend-
ing contract. Having worked out a scheme of separating "bad" ex-
change controls from those necessary and appropriate in certain
circumstances, the Agreement enables countries using the tool "appro-
priately" (in the Fund's view) to discourage violation of the controls
by the threat of unenforceability in the courts of any member state of
contracts made in contravention of the "good" controls.
Now, that is all very well, but, as any perceptive law student learns
in the first year of law school, unenforceability of a contract (here
under the rubric of "illegality") is far less a deterrent to socially abhor-
rent conduct than the possibility of liability for civil damages in a tort
suit. If the parties to the contract allowing or providing for illegal
capital flight do not ever bring the contract to court, the sanction of
unenforceability never bites; yet the developing country's reserves
2. A. LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 323 (2d ed. 1981).
3. Id.
4. This pertains at least with respect to current transactions. Space prevents a precise de-
lineation of the scope of the Fund Agreement's provisions concerning exchange controls.
5. In any event, given R. EDWARDS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION (1985),
and the works of Sir Joseph Gold cited therein, more perhaps than one wants to know about the
section is already in print.
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have suffered the same injury - the life blood of foreign exchange has
still been spilled, to continue our initial metaphor.
It presumably was just this realization that caused Brazil, through
its central bank, Banco do Brazil, to bring a tort suit in the 1960s
against a United States coffee importer, Israel Commodity, which had
colluded with a Brazilian coffee exporter to allow the exporter to es-
cape turning its dollar earnings over to the central bank at a rate for
cruzeiros fixed by Brazil - a currency restriction to which Brazil was
entitled under the Fund Agreement. 6 Briefly, Banco do Brazil argued
that it should be entitled to damages resulting from the "conspiracy to
defraud the Government of Brazil of American dollars by illegally cir-
cumventing the foreign exchange regulations of Brazil. ' ' 7 The major-
ity of the New York Court of Appeals decided against Brazil, holding
that while the intention of the Fund Agreement's Article VIII § 2(b)
was to render illicit contracts unenforceable, "an obligation to with-
hold judicial assistance to secure the benefits of such contracts does
not imply an obligation to impose tort penalties on those who have
fully executed them."' 8 The majority could not find in New York law
(the law of the transaction) any obligation on individuals not to enter
into contracts contrary to the exchange controls of a member country
of the Fund. The court continued, "[wihile it [Article VIII § 2(b)]
does mean that they [individuals making contracts violating a member
country's exchange controls] so agree at their peril inasmuch as they
may not look to our courts for enforcement, this again is far from
implying that one who so agrees commits a tort in New York .for
which he must respond in damages."9 The majority then went on to
bolster its decision by pointing out that if it were to sanction a tort
suit, such a suit would violate the hallowed conflicts rule concerning
the refusal to enforce another State's revenue laws.
Chief Judge Desmond was trenchant in dissent: "Refusal to enter-
tain this suit does violence to our national policy of co-operation with
other Bretton Woods signatories and is not required by anything in
our own State policy." 10
Subsequently, in 1975, a private Brazilian bank sued persons who
had convinced the bank to violate Brazil's exchange controls with the
result that the bank was penalized by Brazil for having so facilitated
6. Banco do Brazil, S.A. v. A.C. Israel Commodity Co.,Inc., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 190 N.E.2d 235,
239 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964).
7. 12 N.Y.2d at 374.
8. 12 N.Y.2d at 376.
9. 12 N.Y.2d at 376-77.
10. 12 N.Y.2d at 378-79, 190 N.E.2d at 238, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 876-77.
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the exchange control violation. "1 The New York Court of Appeals
there shifted to Judge Desmond's view concerning the old conflicts
rule, but left standing, in effect, the original case's thesis that participa-
tion in a conspiracy to violate a state's Fund-validated exchange con-
trol laws does not state a cause of action sounding in tort. The court
distinguished Banco do Brazil on the specious ground that there the
sovereign itself was suing.' 2
It is the thesis of this essay that were the Banco do Brazil case to
come up today, either in the New York courts or in a federal court,
Brazil as plaintiff (through the central bank) could have another string
to its bow other than trying to read Article VIII § 2(b) of the Fund
Agreement (with certain violation to its negotiating history3) as creat-
ing a tort cause of action. In trying to get damages for injury to its
foreign currency reserves, Brazil could make good use of a federal stat-
ute, the Alien Tort Statute,14 first enacted as part of the Judiciary Act
of 1789,15 and later brought to prominence in a now justly famous
international human rights case, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.'6
The Alien Tort Statute grants federal district courts jurisdiction
over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in viola-
tion of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.' 7 Like
Article VIII § 2(b), the Statute has, since its 1980 resurrection, been
extensively - indeed exhaustively - commented upon,' 8 argued in
numerous cases (one of which, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,'9
would, if the Bork individual opinion were to be followed, severely
restrict its use to a most limited class of violations of international
law), and may be addressed by the Supreme Court when its decision in
11. Banco Frances E. Brasiliero S.A. v. Doe No. 1, 36 N.Y.2d 592, 331 N.E.2d 502, 370
N.Y.S.2d 534 (1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 867 (1975). The defendants had convinced the bank
to exchange Brazilian cruzeiros for U.S. Dollar-denominated travelers checks.
12. 36 N.Y.2d 598-99, 331 N.E.2d 506-07, 370 N.Y.S.2d 539-40.
13. The majority in Banco do Brazil recited these. 12 N.Y.2d at 375-77.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
15. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 9, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1982).
16. 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
18. See Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789. A Badge of Honor.
This article is presently in manuscript and is expected to be published by the American Journal of
International Law after the Supreme Court has decided Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argen-
tine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988). The article
contains complete citations and has been most helpful to me in thinking about this essay. Ms.
Burley particularly cites to and elaborates upon the extensive history of the Statute given in
Casto, Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of
Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467 (1986).
19. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 
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Amerada Hess20 comes down. The Statute was used in Filartiga2t to
allow a Paraguayan family whose son had been tortured to death by a
Paraguayan police chief to sue the police chief for civil damages for
violation of the international norm against torture, which the Court
found to be today part of customary international law. Thus, if Filar-
tiga is followed rather than Tel-Oren,22 an alien injured by an action of
a defendant that can be characterized as a "tort" "committed in viola-
tion of" international law, can have redress either in federal court, or,
as Burley demonstrates, state court,23 if personal jurisdiction can be
obtained over the defendant.
Now, the curious point about the cases since 1980 that have raised
the Statute is that in not one is a foreign state the plaintiff. Some of
the cases concern, as in Filartiga, a private plaintiff against a private
defendant; 24 most concern a state or state actor as defendant and thus
raise issues of sovereign immunity (the major issue in Amerada Hess)
and the Act of State doctrine. To date, foreign sovereigns injured by
acts of a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction, as in Banco do Brazil, have
not thought to avail themselves of the Statute; yet the Statute would
seem to lend itself very well indeed to what Brazil was trying to ac-
complish in the Banco do Brazil case.
Following the lead in Filartiga, if Brazil could show that contem-
porary state practice under the Fund Agreement (e.g., state practice of
submission of proposed exchange control regulations to the Fund; dis-
cussion with the Fund of means to conserve foreign exchange; Fund
teams sent to states in foreign exchange crisis to work out a stabiliza-
tion agreement; and state practice to get Fund seal of approval of such
agreements before additional borrowing or rescheduling of loan agree-
ment with private banks) all adds up to the formation of a customary
norm of international protection - with Fund approval - of foreign
exchange for nations in exchange crisis, then Brazil should be able to
obtain damages from the next Israel Commodity for having, by its
collusion with Brazil's coffee exporter, committed a tort in violation of
the norm. Indeed, to the extent that any private party subject to U.S.
20. 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
21. 630 F.2d 876.
22. 726 F.2d 774.
23. See Burley, supra note 18.
24. See Kirgis, Alien Tort Claims, Sovereign Immunity and International Law in U.S. Courts,
82 AM. J. INT'L L. 323, 329 (1988) for the point, not addressed in Filartiga, that there may be an
intellectual problem as to how "an individual who commits torture is personally responsible
under customary international law." Id. In this, I think Kirgis is himself misled; the Statute
clearly, as is demonstrated by Casto, supra note 13, and Burley, supra note 13, was intended to
permit a civil cause of action against an individual who had injured, say, an Ambassador.
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jurisdiction knowingly 25 participates in capital flight from a nation try-
ing to stem such flight according to its agreements with the Fund, that
party could be subject to suit in state or federal court for civil dam-
ages. Since the cause of action arises under the law of nations as incor-
porated in state and federal law, the problem with the old conflicts
rule (not enforcing another State's "revenue law") should not even
arise. By definition, the law of nations is everyone's law.
International human rights law does indeed have something to
teach international monetary law.
25. One assumes that any such suit would need to show the requisite scienter for an inten-
tional tort; that the tort is committed in violation of the law of nations rather than the common
law should not change the essential elements of the cause of action.
